Climate change blues: sustaining village life in Tonga by Brown Pulu, TJ
 Teena Brown Pulu has a PhD in anthropology from the University of Waikato. 
She is a senior lecturer in Pacific development at AUT University.  Her first book 
was published in 2011, Shoot the Messenger: The report on the Nuku’alofa 
reconstruction project and why the Government of Tonga dumped it. 
TEENA BROWN PULU  
 
 
Climate-Change Blues: Sustaining 







The loss of small island states will affect us all.  
Climate change refugees will become a very serious 
issue for all countries. 
Lord Ma’afu 
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On the afternoon of December 15th 2009, Tonga’s Minister 
for Environment and Climate Change, Lord Ma’afu, made a 
passionate plea to the international press assembled at the 
15th United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen, Denmark.  He had a message he wanted to get 
out to the world.  Politically, Ma’afu awoke a subconscious fear 
developed countries stepped around not wanting to stir and be 
forced to deal with.  Snared in the small island uncertainty of 
rising sea levels was the inevitability climate change refugees 
might need another place to live (Bedford and Bedford, 2010; 
Fagan, 2013).  Where would they go?  Who would take them 
in?  What countries would help the Pacific Islands? 
Despite sociologists and political scientists documenting 
the failure of global governance to deliver a legally binding 
agreement for controlling climate change (Giddens, 2009; Held 
and Hervey, 2009; Fisher, 2004), alternatives put forward have 
not been taken up.  What other methods for governing over 
bad weather are there? (Goldin, 2013).  And how is village life 
in Tonga coping with climate blues? 
 
 
Our land, our home 
 
The best people possess a feeling for beauty, the 
courage to take risks, the discipline to tell the truth, the 
capacity for sacrifice.  Ironically, their virtues make 




Ma’afu’s sentiments were purposeful.  He silenced the 
room.  Addressing a press conference on Sinking Islands, The 
Pacific Voice, his words held listeners close as if he was 
whispering something so gravely serious he could only utter it 
once. 
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Our land is precious for us.  It is our home.  It is 
owned by our fathers and grandfathers, and we do not 
want to leave it; especially because change is 
something we did not cause.  We want to continue to 
pass it on to our children and grandchildren. 
Lord Ma’afu 
 
Marianne de Nazareth, an environmental reporter from 
Goa wrote Ma’afu spoke emotionally (de Nazareth, 2009), quite 
unexpected for a government minister, especially a noble of 
Tonga’s ruling class disciplined to maintain “role distance in 
conversations” with ordinary people (Marcus, 1980, p. 435).  
But under pressure to get a win for his country, his ocean 
region, his part of the world, and with hope disappearing the 
big country polluters would assent to reducing carbon 
emissions, he put it out there unpretentiously and without 
airs.  He wore no camouflage, which was extraordinary for a 
politician at a United Nations talkfest to strip down to their 
vulnerability.  This is what struck people and stuck in their 
memory.  His naked truth both haunted and lured them. 
 
Press Conference on Sinking Islands, The Pacific Voice, at 
the 15th United Nations Conference on Climate Change, 
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Copenhagen, Denmark, 15 December 2009: Rebecca 
Asigau, youth representative of Papua New Guinea; 
Maylin Sese, youth representative of the Solomon Islands; 
Espen Ronneberg, climate change advisor to the South 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP); Lord 
Ma’afu, Tonga Minister for Environment and Climate 
Change. (Photograph: The Guardian, 2009). 
 
At the 15th United Nations Conference on Climate Change 
in Copenhagen, Denmark, on December 15th 2009, it was not 
what Tonga’s Minister for Environment and Climate Change, 
Lord Ma’afu, said to a press conference that won him notoriety 
with mostly European journalists.  It was the way he delivered.  
Eyes down, the bond to his people at home broke his 
concentration on reading a script word-for-word, letting the 
audience know he was battling to contain emotion, fighting 
back tears for his country.  The place closest to his heart he 
did not want to lose to cyclone and rising sea was the very 
manifestation of sinking islands he was thinking of. 
Curtis Doebbler, law professor at An-Najah National 
University in Palestine co-authored a cutting commentary 
stating what the poorest countries in the world undergoing the 
greatest deterioration from climate change had inherited from 
the richer ones: “In the end, selfishness and greed triumphed 
as the legacy of Copenhagen” (Doebbler and Wewerinke, 2009).  
Doebbler echoed the widespread indignity that people felt 
coming away without an accord in hand. 
A week of “just arguments” put on the negotiations table 
had not resulted in a legally binding agreement to reduce 
carbon emissions.  And this triggered a power imbalance that 
was agonisingly painful for developing countries that were 
present and accounted for, observant and focused, but not 
counted in the final decision.  The tale unfolded that America 
and a cluster of big polluter states blocked the doorway to 
reaching consensus on how immediate climate action would 
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be taken.  Understandably Doebbler vented his frustration, 
giving reason to his rage. 
 
In the end it was not the logic of science or the 
integrity of just arguments that prevailed, but rather the 
brute force of political and economic power that forced 
an outcome that threatens the planet that the 
indigenous peoples call Mother Earth.  The calls of 
indigenous leader and Bolivian President Evo Morales 
to ensure global warming would not exceed 1.5 degree 
Celsius fell on deaf ears.  The plea by Reverend 
Desmond Tutu that “no agreement is better than a bad 
agreement” was ignored.  The impassioned logic of 
Ambassador Lumumba Di-Aping to act in the interest of 
all the people on earth and not just a selected few elites 
went unheeded. (Doebbler and Wewerinke, 2009). 
 
 
Global governance passed away 
In Ma’afu’s case, he had breathed in enough toxicity from the 
political atmosphere, exhaling with greater conviction that 
climate “change is something we did not cause.”  His logic 
propelled the climate case of Pacific Island states; that is, we 
are forced by the powerful to suffer the ill-fated consequences 
of having their greenhouse gasses invade our ocean, the 
caregiver for small islands and her peoples (Paton, 2009).  The 
sea mother had turned rabid and was rising, eating her own. 
Four years ago there was an undercurrent to Ma’afu’s 
declaration which foretold the dilemma faced today (Gibson, 
2010).  Not singly were the seventeen Pacific countries 
affiliated to the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) on 
global climate change not the cause of climate change 
(Uludong, 2013), neither did they instigate world governance, 
the United Nations structure and process for getting member 
states to come to a consensus on climate action.  As Doebbler 
pointed out, the negotiations method favoured “a selected few 
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elites” and by no means acted “in the interest of all the people 
on earth.” 
But if the system was inequitable the question which 
surfaced was why were political leaders, especially leaders of 
poor countries, still investing faith in world governance to 
provide a fair solution to their predicament?  It did not make 
sense, but then The Politics of Climate Change (Giddens, 2009) 
were not entirely rational, reasonable, and realistic.  
Environmental scientist, Jerald Schnoor raised the human 
disaster warning that climate change researchers and 
journalists were grappling to cope with: “What if the process to 
negotiate an international climate treaty is completely 
broken?” (Schnoor, 2010). 
Schnoor mapped out the hard-bitten reality.  He validated 
how the 15th United Nations Climate Change Conference 
failed to deliver a comprehensive arrangement which could be 
sustainably practiced for the next ten to forty years (De 
Mesquita, 2009).  In context, the United Nations principles 
which measured “a final agreement” were that an accord had 
to be “fair, ambitious, and binding” (Schnoor, 2010).  Clearly 
the Copenhagen deliberations achieved none of these. 
 
COP15 fell far short of its goals.  It did not establish 
emission reduction targets for developed countries, 
either short (2020) or long-term (2050); it did not set a 
deadline for a binding treaty; and it did not pass the 
policy most clearly supported by all 193 countries, 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD).  Of the three criteria for a final 
agreement: Fair, Ambitious, and Binding (FAB), the 
Copenhagen Accord failed on all three accounts.  The 
poorest nations do not believe it is fair; the European 
Union (EU) and climate scientists would certainly not 
characterize it as ambitious; and the Copenhagen 
Accord that emerged is not binding. (Schnoor, 2010). 
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From Schnoor’s description of events, the sharpened point 
about “broken process” had gotten wedged in critical thought 
(Schnoor, 2010).  Here was the model argument that wedded 
democracy and global governance in a long-term commitment 
to climate change (Fisher, 2004).  In this sense, because global 
governance had failed to deliver a legal framework managing 
climate change internationally, or rather, controlling the 
biggest polluters by an international system of fines and 
penalties, theories were fuelled as to how climate action could 
hold world powers to account.  The reality was world powers 
doubled up as world polluters, the United States of America 
and Asia’s fast-developing economies of China and India. 
Public policy researchers David Held and Angus Hervey 
emphasised the relationship key was mobilising “state level 
solutions” as the method of political bargaining power at the 
“global governance level” (Held and Hervey, 2009, p. 2).  In 
terms of public policy, Held and Hervey argued the opposite 
scenario had taken hold. 
 
At global governance level there has so far been a 
failure to generate a sound and effective international 
framework for managing global climate change, whilst 
at state level solutions are weak and struggle to 
transcend the normal push and pull of partisan politics. 
(Held and Hervey, 2009, p. 2). 
 
Underpinning the authors’ theory was the notion that if 
“state level solutions” were robust as opposed to weak, 
national policy could pressure and manipulate “global 
governance” into climate action.  In actual fact, Held and 
Hervey were responding to what Idso, Carter, and Singer had 
described in one short sentence: “But one thing is certain: The 
Kyoto Protocol is dead” (Idso, Carter, and Singer, 2011, p. vi).  
If global governance had passed away, then another course of 
action was for national laws, regulations, and policies to make 
climate adaptation the state’s foremost priority, and for the 
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nation-state to collaborate regionally and internationally for 
climate justice.  In their introduction to a United Nations 
commissioned report on Climate Change Reconsidered by a 
panel of nongovernmental organisations, Idso, Carter, and 
Singer made it painstakingly clear that the Kyoto Protocol 
1997 was terminally defunct (Idso, Carter, and Singer, 2011, 
p. vi). 
This mandated agreement originally assented to by 192 
parties formed the United Nations Climate Change Convention 
Framework (UNCCCF) from 2005 to 2012 on reducing carbon 
emissions for developed countries.  Developing countries, by 
comparison, were expected to voluntarily reduce emissions by 
steering away from fossil fuels and adopting renewable energy.  
But post 2012 the world was without a legally binding 
agreement which the UNCCCF could act on with majority 
support from member states.  Powerful countries had broken 
away from post 2012 emissions’ targets largely because the 
United Nations looked as if it would endorse that developing 
countries with legitimate claims for environmental loss and 
damage should receive compensation (Lipset, 2013). 
China, categorised as a developing country, emitted 14% of 
the world’s greenhouse gases.  The catch was its developing 
country status meant that although China was an emerging 
economy on the global stage, it was not legally obliged to an 
international agreement.  Exacerbating political tension was 
Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Canada, and the USA, the 
developed countries that refused to take on a new legally 
binding framework put forward at the United Nations climate 




Pacific states, Pacific region 
In the South Pacific region, Pacific Island states were pursuing 
a two-fold climate strategy of strengthening national policy 
and regional cooperation.  The difficulty, as the Cook Islands 
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Minister of Finance Mark Brown explained, was working 
through the complex maze of “bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral” agreements to meet all compliances for 
“accessing funds.”  In July of 2013 at the first joint meeting for 
the Pacific platform for disaster risk management and the 
Pacific climate change roundtable convened in Fiji, Brown 
highlighted the frustration of “funds not getting into the 
country for project activities.”  His rationale was that “regional 
organisations” were useful in the sense they could manoeuvre 
their “relationships with development partners” to unlock 
funding for Pacific Island states (Komai, 2013a; Radio New 
Zealand, 2013a). 
 
We have difficulties accessing these funds because 
of the different requirements at the bilateral, regional 
and multilateral level.  These funds are not getting into 
the country for project activities.  This is where we will 
need the support of regional organisations, who can use 
their networks and relationships with development 
partners to access these funding mechanisms. (Mark 
Brown cited in Komai, 2013a). 
 
Sefanaia Nawadra contextualised Mark Brown’s 
discussion.  Nawadra, the director of the environmental 
monitoring and governance (EMG) division at the Secretariat 
for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), 
succinctly described the funding predicament for Pacific Island 
states. 
 
Many of our small island countries struggle to deal 
with the multitude of international agreements, policy 
commitments and related implementation and reporting 
requirements. (Sefanaia Nawadra cited in Komai, 
2013b). 
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A barrage of bureaucratic red-tape and “reporting 
requirements” made the funding flow from First World donor 
to Third World recipient a complicated, cumbersome 
procedure (Perrottet, 2013).  Nawadra implied the “struggle to 
deal with the multitude of international agreements” did not 
hinge individually on capacity building and re-training 
bureaucrats in small island developing states to comply with 
the demands of international agencies (Komai, 2013b).  There 
were big picture problems, compounded by an underlying 
strain in that international agreements took place in different 
systematic arrangements from country to country, regionally 
between countries, and multilaterally between regions.  What 
was agreed to, more often than not, collided and cancelled 
each other out at various levels of geo-political influence. 
In Tonga’s case, strengthening country to country ties with 
the People’s Republic of China triggered tension and suspicion 
from New Zealand, the traditional development partner.  For 
the newly formed Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) 
led by the Republic of Fiji, its very inception stirred unease 
and nervousness with the conventional Pacific Islands Forum 
dominated by Australia and New Zealand.  The worry was 
whether the Fiji-led inter-government alliance would contest, 
challenge, and eventually eclipse the regional polity leadership 
and power-base of Australia and New Zealand. 
Lastly on the international stage, Tonga’s Minister for 
Finance Lisiate ‘Akolo clarified that national strategies for 
climate adaptation such as accelerating renewable energy 
sources had the potential to conflict with policy conditions set-
down by the inter-government organisations of developed 
countries.  On this point, ‘Akolo described an incident that 
occurred in which European Union (EU) funding was withheld 
from the Tonga Energy Road Map (TERM). 
 
[Tonga Minister for Finance Lisiate ‘Akolo] said that 
under Policy Metric there was a list of things for 
government to do before budget support is released.  
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Under the current budget because the Tonga Energy 
Road Map (TERM) had failed to fulfil the EU 
requirement, they did not release their budget support. 
(Matangi Tonga, 2013b).  
 
The former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Mekere 
Morauta, called out the development dilemma in moving 
regional polity forward for Pacific Island states.  As the chair of 
the team conducting the second Pacific Plan Review 2013, 
Morauta’s criticism was candid.  The Pacific Plan for Regional 
Integration and Cooperation 2005 was “the master strategy” 
directing the 15 member countries of the Pacific Islands 
Forum in how inter-government polity among the South Pacific 
states led by Australia and New Zealand, was carried out 
(Pacific Plan Review, 2013). 
In his preliminary comments on the review process, 
Morauta bluntly stated “the rules of the game are wrong” 
(Morauta, 2013).  Expressing that he thought “governance 
structures” did not deliver what was pledged in policies, plans, 
and strategies, he saw that funding to small island developing 
states defined what they got.  Subsequently, the rules of 
overseas funders disallowed Pacific Island states to make 
development decisions according to their own “political values” 
and community needs (Morauta, 2013). 
 
The institutions – the ‘rules of the game’ – are 
wrong, or perhaps have gradually been weakened by, 
on the one hand, governance structures that don’t 
ensure the right outcomes, and on the other hand 
incentives – usually financing incentives – that serve to 
shape the agenda more than does the exercise of 
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The people are not happy Natives 
In Tonga, the Tu’ivakano government floated a political desire 
for the state to foster closer working relations with 
communities to make climate adaptation happen.  Tonga’s 
first government after the 2010 democratic reform decided in 
2013, its third year of four in office, to brand the 
administration to resemble the climate campaigners.  What 
the government’s aspiration came down to by way of 
community development that did not rely on state financing 
and aid assistance was never revealed in official statements 
and national policy.  One factor was sure; the government 
budget was heavily dependent on aid donations and bank 
grants which were not at all guaranteed as an absolute done-
deal because the final decision belonged to the money-giver 
not the developing country recipient. 
 
Lord Nuku, noble and estate-holder of Kolonga in the 
eastern district of Tonga, standing on the seawall 
fronting Kolonga foreshore and coral reef which is used 
by villagers for inshore fisheries.  Depletion of stock 
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compounded by rising sea levels is a conservation and 
sustainable food supply priority. 
 
The Government of Tonga did not have the capacity or 
reach to bankroll climate mitigation projects that village 
communities across the country wanted in their territorial 
confines.  People in the village knew that the talk of 
international funding for climate adaptation in small island 
developing states was illusive.  It was understood as pie-in-
the-sky political rhetoric, meaning the much coveted funding 
was out-of-reach for villagers living and suffering silently on 
the ground. 
The notion that ordinary Tongans were suffering in silence 
manifested for two weeks in July of 2013 when Television 
Tonga News aired evening segments on the parliamentary 
visits of the peoples’ representatives to constituencies.  
Overall, meetings were not well attended with what appeared 
to be an average of less than 20 adults at various villages 
contributing dialogue on development issues impacting on 
their communities.  Young adults were not visible.  The 
meetings were dominated by middle-aged to elderly men.  Most 
notably, however, only some villages from the largest island of 
Tongatapu featured in the news items, illustrating the privilege 
of being located on the mainland in contrast to living on an 
outer island, the peripheral edge of Tonga given less 
development priority. 
Significantly, gatherings were not solutions oriented but 
forums for people to air concerns, disgruntlement with the 
government’s lack of action, and at times, long-running 
grievances.  A standard line the people’s representatives to 
parliament fed to registered voters in attendance was that 
selected discussion points would be raised in reports to the 
House.  The final decision on what got reported and what was 
left out was made by the parliamentarians not the people 
because a democratic vote at constituency meetings on the top 
priorities of communities did not eventuate. 
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The facial expressions and body language of men and 
women gathered in church and community halls for the 
parliamentary visits showed despondency and 
disenchantment.  Television cameras scanned audiences of 
grimaces, scowls, and arms folded in defiance, gesturing that 
the political scenario of not having matters resolved had been 
seen and heard before.  By this, failing to take action on 
community interests was a repeat episode of the Tongan 
state’s method for dealing with constituencies before the 2010 
democratic reform.  People were fed up with authoritarian, 
high-handed, patronising, and full-of-advice parliamentarians 
telling them the issues would be reported, recorded, and filed 
with the bureaucracy.  Politically in terms of power sharing 
and participatory democracy, what had changed? 
Surprisingly it was ‘Akilisi Pohiva, the leader of the 
Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands which was the 
opposition in the House, who had changed his tune by 
modifying his traditional practice of anti-government politics.  
Pohiva in the present had done a turn-around and was now 
backing the state and the church as Tonga’s bedrock of 
authority and social control over the people.  Sixteen years ago 
in 1997 Pohiva had a different story about the Government of 
Tonga which he shared with David Robie, a journalism 
academic filming a documentary on media freedom in South 
Pacific states. 
 
Tonga is not a democratic country.  The most vital 
element of a democratic government is accountability.  
There is a complete lack of accountability that causes 
corruptions, misuse of the resources, and other evils in 
the country.  (Robie, 1997). 
 
In 2013, Pohiva’s message to his constituency Tongatapu 
1 was that the “evils in the country” were no longer attributed 
to the government (Robie, 1997).  Put simply, the development 
miseries of Tonga’s villages were not entirely the government of 
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the day’s fault.  Rather, the amount of community 
development projects the Tongan state could commit to 
depended on the amount of funds allocated in the national 
budget. 
 
Tongatapu number one representative says that all 
the issues of concern have been recorded and will be 
submitted to the House, and the rest will be discussed 
by Kolomotu’a town council.  In the meantime, he 
highlights that the implementation of these works is 
very much depending on the government’s revenue. 
(Television Tonga News, 2013a). 
 
Pohiva gave strong advice to his constituency to “work 
together with the government and the church.”  It was a 
“must” that the people cooperated with the authorities of a 
small island power structure to avoid dissent and 
disagreement (Television Tonga News, 2013b). 
 
Meanwhile the parliamentarian of the constituency 
told the meeting, that it’s the government’s role to 
monitor and take care of its development activities.  
Pohiva also advised the meeting that in order to achieve 
their needs the people must work together with the 
government and the church. (Television Tonga News, 
2013b). 
 
What became perceptible from Pohiva’s political 
instruction to voters in his electorate is that Tonga’s longest 
running people’s representative of twenty six years had an 
official line to deliver.  In context, it was not that Pohiva did 
not hear what the audience brought up during his 
parliamentary visit.  Instead, he elected to push the official 
line that state compliance and church conformity 
corresponded with political and economic development for 
Tongan communities.  This was a far cry from the Pohiva of 
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old arguing that Tonga was “not a democratic country” and the 
government is not accountable to the people, but a law unto 
itself (Robie, 1997). 
The query that emerged was why had the leader of the 
Democratic Party changed his strategy in mid-stream?  Moving 
towards an election year in 2014, Pohiva’s unwillingness to 
explain his pro-government position aroused suspicion among 
voters.  In the social climate of democratic reform, for a 
parliamentarian to order his constituency to obey the state 
bureaucracy and the church without question or qualm did 
not, by any means, convey transparent communication.  What 
were the reasons for the Member of Parliament’s call to such 
action? 
Pohiva’s political metamorphosis was viewed with 
scepticism.  Customarily, he expressed anti-government 
policies.  His defiance against the Tongan state as an 
opposition leader had won him notoriety with, and support 
from, international media and sympathisers.  But as a career 
politician, what did he stand to gain from throwing his lot in 
with the establishment?  Were Pohiva’s sights still set on 
becoming the elected Prime Minister in 2014 at 70+ years old?  
If so, then perhaps his transition towards state and church 
loyalty reflected how he would quell public criticism if elected 
to office. 
Nukunuku, the principal village on the estate of the noble 
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano with a population of 1,781 
gathered an audience of around twenty adults for the 
parliamentary visit of people’s representative for Tongatapu 5, 
‘Aisake Eke (Maron and Connell, 2008).  Eke was an 
independent member of parliament.  However, in July 2013 he 
demonstrated support for ‘Akilisi Pohiva’s Democratic Party by 
signing off a parliamentary bill submitted by the party.  The 
bill proposed that Tongan citizens registered on the general 
electoral roll elect the prime minister (Kaniva Pacific, 2013).  
Under Tonga’s political structure which was reformed in 2010, 
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the prime minister was elected by parliament not the 
registered voters. 
This was the second incident in Eke’s 2010 to 2014 history 
as the Tongatapu 5 member of parliament that his political 
will split public opinion within Nukunuku.  The first was his 
backing of the motion for a vote of no confidence in the Prime 
Minister Lord Tu’ivakano put forward in the House on June 
28th 2012 by ‘Akilisi Pohiva and the Democratic Party.  
Nukunuku, the village at the heart of the Prime Minister’s 
estate was fractured in two, where some endorsed Eke and the 
Democratic Party’s latest bill, while others objected.  The 
reality was there appeared to be more people living on the 
Noble Tu’ivakano’s estate, which encompassed four villages, 
who opposed.  Thus, the obvious way to show disagreement 
with Eke’s politics was by not attending his parliamentary 
visit. 
An independent member of parliament’s role and 
responsibility provided the frame and focus for questioning 
Eke’s political strategies.  His actions put him in direct 
opposition with the Prime Minister, who was the estate-holder 
for his constituency.  However, this did not necessarily shape 
the dispute from which criticism surfaced.  People probed how 
politically independent he was, given that Eke aligned himself 
closely with the Democratic Party instead of voting in 
parliament the way in which the majority of his constituency 
wanted.  Unveiled were divergent ideas of democracy.  While 
Eke advocated that a prime minister elected by registered 
voters would engineer greater public accountability, his own 
constituency reconsidered how they could hold their member 
of parliament accountable to ensure his vote on bills and 
debates in the House corresponded with their public interests. 
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Tu’ivakano Poutele Hall where the parliamentary visit 
was held for the people’s representative of Tongatapu 5, 
‘Aisake Eke.  Tu’ivakano Poutele Hall is located in the 
centre of Nukunuku, the principal village on the estate of 
the noble Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano. 
 
During Eke’s annual parliamentary visit, the Nukunuku 
town officer commented that rising sea levels had caused “soil 
erosion” and the loss of two acres of land in western district 
(Television Tonga News, 2013a).  This, he thought, was the 
pressing matter for the village.  The climate fear was that given 
the rate of land loss, could village life be sustained, and for 
how long until relocation was the only option for survival on a 
coral atoll?  The town officer asked if a foreshore could be 
constructed as a measure of resilience for keeping back “the 
hungry tide” (Zubrycki, 2011). 
 
Meanwhile, [Nukunuku] town officer Matafonua 
requested whether they can build a foreshore to combat 
soil erosion in the western district.  He told the 
gathering that impacts on climate change causes 
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erosion to two acres of land in the area. (Television 
Tonga News, 2013a). 
 
 
Top-down policy trap 
The “request” exposed that government policy flunked at 
integrating community development into its practical 
application (Television Tonga News, 2013a).  Marginal 
coordination was transacted between national strategies for 
climate adaptation, and projects that villages desired, such as 
the Nukunuku town officer’s proposal to build foreshore 
resilience in western district.  Two conversations about climate 
change were gaining traction in Tonga, but oddly, the 
participant groups were not in partnership or working 
alongside each other.  Primary discussions took place among 
state bureaucrats pushing to make Tonga the first Pacific 
Island country to implement a national climate change plan 
bankrolled by the United Nations Development Programme 
Global Environment Facility (UNDP-GEF).  Conversely, 
peripheral dialogue came from village communities, who once-
a-year were given a chance to list development priorities and 
goals for the visiting member of parliament to report back to 
the House. 
Structurally, there were two gaping cracks preventing any 
systematic cohesion between the climate talk from above, and 
the murmurs from below.  Firstly, the Tongan state did not 
possess nor practice a national policy framework integrating 
all sectors under a climate adaptation plan.  This was still in 
the pipeline and the logic of designing one was top-down, 
driven by the availability of international funding and the 
results that funders demanded, rather than the communities’ 
self-determined needs and aspirations. 
An interview with Television Tonga News saw the “national 
coordinator for Tonga’s climate change” plan call for ordinary 
Tongan citizens – the key stakeholders in the country’s 
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adaptation – to be involved in high-level discussions with the 
state bureaucracy (Television Tonga News, 2013d).  
 
A national coordinator for Tonga’s climate change 
project says the workshop was held in Nuku’alofa to 
educate stakeholders on the issue.  It also highlights 
the need for people to join in national discussions so 
they are aware of the effects of climate change. 
(Television Tonga News, 2013d). 
 
By no means was the national coordinator suggesting that 
communities were to contribute to the national plan’s design 
and how it would be carried out in villages and districts.  
Conversely, he was insinuating that raising public awareness 
on what the government was doing, provided the method for 
getting community agreement that the state bureaucracy is 
the national controller over what would, and would not, get 
done.  National climate action was delivered on a shoe-string 
budget dependent on overseas aid, regional organisations, and 
United Nations (UN) funding.  In a coconut shell, the state was 
the gatekeeper in charge. 
The novel idea that village communities had local 
knowhow, teamwork, and resources to plan and put into 
action climate projects did not altogether register with the 
machinery of government.  Moving forward from an obsolete 
public servant mentality, one in which it was believed the state 
bureaucracy knew what was best for the people and would do 
what it wanted regardless of what citizens thought, proved 
difficult.  In Tonga, the government sector grappled to practice 
structural reform and organisational change to build an 
inclusive society grounded in participatory democracy. 
Secondly, the Tongan state adhered to the advice of 
Margareta Wahlstrom, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General for the United Nations Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNISDR) based in Geneva, Switzerland.  En 
route to address the inaugural joint meeting of the Pacific 
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Platform for Disaster Risk Management and Pacific Climate 
Change Roundtable forum in Fiji from July 8th to the 11th, 
she stopped over in Tonga.  At a quasi-public meeting that 
appealed more to bureaucrats than people who were not 
employed by the government, Wahlstrom took it upon herself 
and her position of power to define what “ordinary citizens 
should be concerned” about in the Kingdom of Tonga (Folau, 
2013). 
 
Ordinary citizens should be concerned because you 
live in an environment where you can anticipate there 
would be another cyclone for earthquake and you can 
lose your personal belongings, or your production like a 
farmer loses his harvest.  In addition, very few people 
have insurance or any financial buffer let alone the risk 
of losing healthcare and education time if schools are 
closed, or you even lose a member of your family.” 
(Margareta Wahlstrom cited in Folau, 2013). 
 
Laced in the speech-making was the top-down policy trap 
of deficit theory; that is, the argument that “ordinary citizens” 
of developing countries were at greater risk of losing lives and 
livelihoods because they were financially ill-prepared for loss 
and damage.  However, the Western-centric idea that loss and 
damage caused by natural disaster could be moderated by 
insurance, failed to understand ordinary lives in small island 
developing states.  By what means was it possible for poor 
people to have the financial capability to insure “personal 
belongings” and property, particularly in Tonga, where 
traditional land tenure meant that “ordinary citizens” not of 
the landed gentry leased, but did not out rightly own, land? 
(Folau, 2013a). 
Despite being situated at odds with Western economic 
liberalism in which citizens safeguarded their ownership over 
private property by purchasing insurance, the Government of 
Tonga followed suit.  In the process of amalgamating disaster 
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management with climate adaptation, the Tongan state was 
crafting a unitary national framework.  Refocusing the country 
on the double risk of natural disaster exacerbated by climate 
change was viewed as the only course of policy action, not 
singly for Tonga but the South Pacific region.  In saying this, 
no locally devised measures integrating traditional knowledge 
were explored or considered worthwhile because the United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction was perceived to 
have direct access to the purse strings, and consequently, 
defined the rules. 
Sitiveni Halapua, the deputy leader of the Democratic 
Party of the Friendly Islands, spoke about integrating 
“indigenous knowledge” into Pacific Islands’ climate 
adaptation.  He thought traditional knowledge had been lost in 
Tonga, disappearing during his “lifetime” (Halapua, 2012).  
Chairing a panel in April of 2012 on indigenous knowledge at 
a University of Hawai’i conference for climate change in the 
Pacific Islands, Halapua opened the discussion with a 
“personal reflection” from his childhood years in Tonga 
(Halapua, 2012). 
 
Let me give you a personal reflection on the issue of 
particularly indigenous knowledge.  One of the 
advantage of just aging quickly, like myself, I was quite 
amazed at how much indigenous knowledge we lost, 
say, even in my home country Tonga during my 
lifetime.  What I had learned when I was a small boy 
growing up and going to the family subsistence garden 
about food security, how to harvest and leave some 
food in case there’s a drought or other natural disaster 
and stuff like that, it’s completely gone; I mean, during 
my lifetime.  I just thinking aloud to myself now 
whether the right place for indigenous knowledge is the 
classroom or the community; do we have enough?  
(Halapua, 2012).  
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Halapua posed a pertinent question: Where was the 
appropriate place to reinvent tradition in Tonga?  Given that 
he saw “indigenous knowledge” had been abandoned to 
modernity, he queried whether it was “the classroom or the 
community” which offered the most accessible learning context 
for resurrecting “food security” in the 21st century through 
“subsistence” gardening (Halapua, 2012). 
Contrariwise, the Government of Tonga’s single-minded 
approach revolved around an illusive pool of international 
funds existing in the opaque language of United Nations’ 
officials.  As long as high-powered bureaucrats like Margareta 
Wahlstrom alluded to money being made available for 
developing states that conformed to the UN agenda, disaster 
management and climate change sang a harmonious duet.  
Given the pressure to comply and toe the line, how could 
Tonga and other small island developing states not cling to 
hope that there really was a pot of gold at the end of the 
adaptation rainbow? 
The Australian Government’s Department of Industry, 
Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary 
Education ran the Pacific Adaptation Strategy Assistance 
Programme (PASAP) for 15 partner countries which were 
Pacific Island states (Australian Government, 2013; Chung, 
2013; Coutts, 2013b).  Fuka Kitekei’aho, Tonga’s national 
coordinator for PASAP, brought to light the rationale of 
conflating disaster management and climate change. 
 
Slowly it seems the livelihood of the people, and 
that’s quite an impact the coastal erosion affect the 
livelihood of the people.  And now there’s hardly 
anybody fishing so the livelihood now for the women 
has been derived from weaving mats. (Fuka Kitekei’aho 
cited in Coutts, 2013b). 
  
In a coconut shell, disaster management coupled with 
climate change sprang into action after environmental 
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calamity happened, that is, after the event.  With the 
reasoning tunnelled towards preparing civilians for 
catastrophe – the threat of losing land, homes, livelihood, and 
lives – there was little scope to see that counteracting climate 
change was possible.  If anything, it was impossible to hold 
back the sea.  Therefore, mitigation and disaster reduction 
effectively meant accepting that the end was nigh because the 




While Tongan bureaucrats took their cue from regional and 
international organisations on what to believe about their 
country’s fateful climate condition, rural villages reviewed their 
prospects from lived experience (Mcelroy, 2013).  
Parliamentary visits of peoples’ representatives to electorates 
conveyed that the public who attended were not migrating 
overseas.  Here were die-hard loyalists determined to stay in 
the homeland, and staying put, especially in rural settlements 
with small populations of kinfolk and clans, necessitated an 
alternative outlook on everyday life compared to the politics 
and policies enacted from above. 
Ordinary people in the village were not drowning.  They 
were fighting against the Tongan state assuming the system 
had the authority to uproot citizens from ancestral lands, 
reefs, lagoons, and access points to the open sea (Mission 
Blue, 2013).  Relocation was a dangerous word.  It meant 
removal, the last option when all else failed and “the hungry 
tide” (Zubrycki, 2011) had conquered the landscape.  But most 
of all, relocation was not on the agenda to be discussed at 
parliamentary visits and village meetings because no citizen 
desired to be forcibly removed from their small, humble place 
of belonging in the expansive ocean-scape. 
Kolonga is the village where my father was born in 1947, 
located in the eastern district of the main island Tongatapu 
(Brown Pulu, 2013).  Currently, the population stands at 
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1,167 according to the Tonga Department of Statistics 2011 
preliminary count.  Lord Nuku, the noble and estate-holder of 
Kolonga and noble’s representative for ‘Eua Island gave a 
higher estimate claiming 2,000 was closer to the mark.  
Whichever approximation it was, out of 518 registered voters 
from Kolonga, ten turned up for the parliamentary visit of 
Semisi Tapueluelu, the people’s representative for Tongatapu. 
 
Lord Nuku, noble and estate-holder of Kolonga in the 
eastern district of Tonga standing on the village 
foreshore which exhibits exposure to sea level rise and 
environmental degradation. 
 
Reflective of rural villages on nobles’ estates, which were 
somewhat different to settlements on government land, 
kinship and clan relationships as well as loyalty to the estate-
holder were customary and socially expected in Kolonga.  
People were focused on livelihood and making a living in their 
territory, which comprised of plantation allotments allocated to 
families and for fishermen, the sea.  A pastoral community 
with a history of cash cropping for the export market, small-
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scale farmers were accustomed to working together and 
trading as a village collective.  Understandably, the 
development urgency was agricultural trade (Maddocks, 2013; 
Wiseman, 2013). 
From the floor, an old farmer evoked the past.  
Remembering Tonga’s golden era when the government 
commodities board bought produce directly from farmers, he 
intimated around state regulation of trade.  In his time, this 
provided a safety measure that guaranteed fairer 
redistribution of employment and income-generating 
opportunities, especially for vulnerable groups like village 
youth.  Importantly, it cut out middle-men from making 
unregulated profit from village growers and monopolising 
export agreements with overseas importers. 
 
I would like to see the reestablishment of the 
commodities board.  I don’t know why it was disowned.  
I’m also concerned for the youth and the increase in 
offenses by youth due to unemployment.  I grew up and 
follow my father in growing the copra and banana for 
export.  I witness the positive effect of the board.  I wish 
that government could resolve this issue so that Tonga 
could live in harmony. (Kolonga Resident 1 cited in 
Television Tonga News, 2013c). 
 
Woven alongside the old farmer’s appeal for government 
support for export trade were the village fishermen. 
 
In another issue some of the fishermen asked for 
government assistance for their fishing boats which 
was provided previously, but has now been on hold 
since 2010. (Kolonga Resident 2 cited in Television 
Tonga News, 2013c). 
 
Again, past government activity was remembered as better 
than the present relationship between rural communities and 
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the state.  Farmers and fishermen intersected on one point; 
the state had abandoned agriculture and fisheries trade when 
it was still the basic livelihood of ordinary people. 
Asked by one audience member if the Government of 
Tonga could provide rudimentary infrastructure in the 
township – roads and streetlights – people’s representative 
Semisi Tapueluelu spoke about Kolonga’s inclusion in a “1.2 
million pa’anga project.”  The Ministry of Environment and 
Climate Change was building a foreshore financed by Climate 
Investment Funds, and contracted out to New Zealand 
engineers for the project design (Climate Investment Funds, 
2012, 2013).  Local Tongan engineers were not employed to 
draw up plans, nor were they invited to work alongside the 
New Zealand consultants to develop industry skills. 
 
In the meeting Mr Tapueluelu clarified that Kolonga 
is included in the 1.2 million pa’anga project of the 
Ministry of Environment for the construction of a 
foreshore from Nukuleka to Kolonga. (Television Tonga 
News, 2013c). 
 
Clearly the people’s representative for Tongatapu 10 had 
missed the boat.  It was obvious he thought the foreshore 
restoration project priced at “1.2 million pa’anga” of Climate 
Investment Funds was the community development priority for 
his constituency.  But was it, really?  This was a top-heavy, 
state driven, multi-million pa’anga exercise paid for by a multi-
lateral funding agency made up of the United Nations, 
international banks, and private sector investors.  Oddly, it 
had botched at involving the people.  By this, the Ministry of 
Environment and Climate Change project did not 
automatically secure the buy-in of villages. 
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Lord Nuku, the noble and estate-holder of Kolonga in 
Tonga walking the seawall fronting his village foreshore 
with the author, Teena Brown Pulu, photographing the 
coastal erosion. 
 
Among Kolonga people there was talk that government 
consultation and information on what was getting done, and 
who was doing it, had not taken place in a way that 
satisfactorily answered questions and concerns, or at the very 
least sought “free, prior, and informed consent” of community 
stakeholders in conjunction with “indigenous peoples’ 
participation rights within international law” (Ward, 2011).  
There were two workshops on the project’s design and 
operation in mid-year of 2013.  Both were shut-off to the 
public, and only the first was reported in Tongan and New 
Zealand media as an affair between Tonga’s Ministry of 
Environment and Climate Change, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the United Nations Strategic Program for Climate 
Resistance (SPCR) along with its contractors, New Zealand and 
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Australian consultants (Matangi Tonga, 2013a; Spasifik 
Magazine, 2013). 
Inviting non-government organisations to the first event in 
May 2013 was intended to represent community interests; not 
that it did, and not that any government bureaucrat identified 
this as the product of systematic divide-and-rule, which the 
Tongan state had failed to undo and resolve.  For rural 
settlements placed under the authority of the government’s 
project, nothing felt more humiliating than having the state 
and outsiders from foreign countries make decisions about a 
foreshore territory that kinfolk belong to, and have used for 
generations, without village approval.  To learn of the rulings 
made over a communal living environment from media reports, 
added insult to wounded village pride. 
Strengthening state level policy on climate adaptation had 
a contrary effect in respect of what it set out to do.  The rift 
between communities and the state had been aggravated not 
alleviated, consolidating government authority over two factors 
defining and confining how community consultation was 
practiced in Tonga.  At the outset, not only did the 
Government of Tonga call community consultation, but the 
state also decided the issues of public importance to be 
consulted on.  There was no equaliser in which villages could 
petition the state to confer with them on matters which they 
considered of great consequence.  Subsequent to this, the 
government developed a dependency problem: It relied on 
multilateral financing to implement climate adaptation, which 
amplified the accountability gap (Australian Government, 
2013; Climate Investment Funds, 2013).  The Government of 
Tonga was truly more answerable and responsible to 
international donor and investment agencies, than it was to 
their own village communities constituting the very country 
the project work was supposed to benefit (Black, 2013). 
Greening the blue 
In the South Seas, the regional gathering singled out for 
disturbing “the order of things” (Foucault, 1970) was the Fiji-
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led Pacific Islands Development Forum.  Convened at the 
Sheraton Fiji Resort on Denarau Island from August 5th to the 
7th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Fijian Government 
hosted the three-day talkfest for Pacific Island governments, 
businesses, and non-government organisations, with 
international donors alongside European and Asian 
governments observing the proceedings. 
The Australian and New Zealand governments were 
apprehensive.  They stood to lose the most, or so media outlets 
in their countries reported (Coutts, 2013a).  No news 
commentary was convinced this was a straight-laced 
development forum.  Instead, it became fixed in the “social 
imagination” as a political stratagem to contest and overthrow 
Australia and New Zealand’s dominance in regional polity, 
trade, and leadership (Mills, 1959).  Not that any high-ranking 
cabinet minister or senior government bureaucrat from 
Australia and New Zealand commented along these lines; their 
silence being interpreted as a response in itself. 
Director of the University of Fiji’s Centre for International 
and Regional Affairs, Richard Herr, exemplified that guesswork 
on what the Pacific Islands Development Forum was really 
about propelled the storyline.  Herr’s analysis was the 
conventional Pacific Islands Forum led by Australia and New 
Zealand had been “a thorn in the side of Fiji,” obstructing 
Prime Minister Bainimarama from assuming the leadership of 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group in 2010.  Founded as a 
counter-body, the Pacific Islands Development Forum adopted 
a different approach orienting its business in government 
collaboration with and all sectors, including not-for-profit 
organisations.  At a glance, it could be seen as a move to 
prohibit Australia and New Zealand’s political interference in 
sub-regional relations between Pacific Island states.  But this 
was not to disregard the potential a new association had to be 
a more relevant interface between governments and 
communities, one reflecting island development priorities 
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rather than Australia and New Zealand’s policies and 
principles. 
 
The reason why I think so much of the commentary 
has been that it’s to replace the forum is that the forum 
clearly has been a thorn in the side of Fiji.  It’s been not 
a conciliatory regional agency but rather used to impose 
sanctions on Fiji.  And indeed this meeting itself grew 
out of a situation when the Prime Minister Frank 
Bainimarama was meant to take over the reins of the 
MSG, the Melanesian Spearhead Group.  That meeting 
was cancelled.  As Fiji saw it, Australia and New 
Zealand interfered with the reins being handed over; 
there was tit-for-tat expulsion of heads of mission.  And 
the arrangement was called the engaging with the 
Pacific meeting.  And that turned out to be much 
broader, and this has emerged out of that.  I guess you 
could say there are mixed signals there.  They are at 
one level, a challenge to the forum, and at another level 
creating a different kind of structure, a parallel body 
that might be more authentic, more legitimate in 
expressing the development needs of the region. 
(Richard Herr cited in Coutts, 2013a). 
 
Whichever way the long-running saga unravelled, clearly 
the Pacific Islands Development Forum had rewritten the 
script by performing a counter narrative with new actors in 
lead roles (Nanol, 2013).  If there was a meeting of political will 
validating how Pacific Island governments, businesses, and 
non-government organisations distinguished their difference 
to, and independence from, Australia and New Zealand, then it 
was through the notion of greening the blue.  That is, by 
conceptualising the world’s largest ocean-scape and its diverse 
islands and peoples as an interconnected “green-blue Pacific 
economy.”  The opening address at the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum given by Fijian Prime Minister, Frank 
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Bainimarama, emphasised that colour coding Pacific Island 
states as “green-blue” had branding power for marketing a 
region of “one ocean, one people” to the outside world (The Jet, 
2013). 
 
We are one ocean, one people, seeking common 
solutions.  And so today we join hands with each other 
and with our development partners from outside the 
region to strive for a Green-Blue Pacific economy. (Prime 
Minister of Fiji cited in The Jet, 2013). 
 
Philippine academic of sustainable environments, Cora 
Claudio, traced the movement of greening the blue to a 
political act by “Pacific Small Island Developing States (Pacific 
SIDS) to gain momentum “on the way to Rio+20,” the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio De 
Janeiro, Brazil from the 20th to the 22nd of June 2012.  The 
author saw the build-up to Rio+20 as an origin moment in 
which Pacific Island states “started promoting ‘Blue Economy,’ 
which is focused on the marine environment.  “For the Pacific 
SIDS,” Claudio recounted, “green economy is a blue economy 
that prominently features oceans, which account for almost 71 
percent of the earth’s surface” (Claudio, 2013). 
Significantly, Claudio noted the economy versus 
environment dichotomy that surfaced in the two-coloured 
labelling of Pacific green-blue economies. 
 
Some concerns of the Pacific SIDS are increasing 
their share of benefits from the use of their marine 
living resources and building the resilience of marine 
ecosystems to the impact of climate change and ocean 
acidification. (Claudio, 2013). 
 
A blue-green balancing act centred on how to use natural 
resources from the ocean for commercial profit, namely fish 
and seabed minerals, while concurrently protecting the 
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environment from further human ruin beyond repair (Garrett, 
2013a, 2013b; Lipset, 2013; Robertson, 2013).  Speaking to 
the “2013 Global Eco-Forum for Building an Eco-Civilization: 
Green Transformation and Transition” (CCTV, 2013) hosted by 
the People’s Republic of China in Guiyang, the Prime Minister 
of Tonga, Lord Tu’ivakano, advocated the blue-green 
trademark. 
 
For us, if you like, in the ocean-locked small island 
countries like Tonga, our environment is dominated by 
the sea.  So if we are talking color coded revolution, our 
experience may be more appropriately called a blue 
revolution, one based in the responsible extraction of 
value from the sea and the responsible custody of that 
very vital resource.  The green-blue paradigm in fact 
completes the picture, for it now takes into account the 
need to include the ocean and the sea in any 
discussion about eco-civilisation and eco-innovation. 
(Prime Minister of Tonga cited in Tonga Government 
Portal, 2013b).  
 
By a similar communication style to the Prime Minister of 
Fiji, the Tongan Premier plugged for oceanic resources as the 
customary economy of Pacific Island states (Tonga 
Government Portal, 2013b, 2013c).  The speech got tangled 
when the conflicting terms “responsible extraction” and 
“responsible custody” were lined up side-by-side suggesting 
that a development formula for reconciling commercialism and 
conservation existed in practice (Tonga Government Portal, 
2013b).  Former Papua New Guinea Prime Minister, Makere 
Morauta, set the record straight.  In reality, there was none.  
The truth was Pacific Island states had not manufactured a 
remedy for integrating the “modernity” of a hyper-capitalist 
economy into small, insular, kin-based societies.  
Concomitantly, in the face of rapid modernisation, how does 
the South Pacific hold “true to its deep-rooted social and 
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cultural values?” (Morauta, 2013).  “Regionalism has lost its 
political direction,” Morauta stated, not mixing his words 
because he could.  He was no longer sitting in the prime 
minister’s hot seat where his words, opinions, and delivery 
were put under the microscope of the media and academia. 
 
How the region deals with modernity – including its 
many socially, economically and politically challenging 
facets – while holding true to its deep-rooted social and 
cultural values is not yet resolved.  Yet we hear loudly 
from citizens and politicians alike that the right political 
conversations are not being had about these things.  
That the region is stumbling into the future, rather than 
confidently striding forwards certain of where it wants 
to go.  Citizens voices, we were told time and time 
again, are not being heard by the political elite.  In 




Solomon Islands academic, Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 
delivered the 2012 plenary at the 9th Conference of the 
European Society for Oceanists (ESfO) hosted by the 
University of Bergen in Norway.  His paper titled, Stories and 
Power in Oceania, addressed storytelling as speech acts of 
social control (Kabutaulaka, 2012b).  Controlling the narrative 
and its retelling, Kabutaulaka commented, was a politicised 
technique framing the manner that governments, nation-
states, societies, and peoples are predominantly represented in 
the public domain. 
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Tarcisius Kabutaulaka navigating his way to the capital 
of Honiara from his homeland on the Weather Coast of 
Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands (Photograph: 
Kabutaulaka, 2012). 
 
Academic researchers, perhaps more so than politicians, 
are highly prized storytellers afforded status and respect for 
their knowledge and viewpoints in any given society (Back, 
2013; Chambers, 2005).  But none-so-much as the small 
islands of the world’s largest ocean where one’s scholarly work 
counts, in many ways, as cultural capital.  By this, I mean 
that intellectual writing is often read as a representation of 
one’s own kinfolk, clan, and countrymen and women.  
Whether it really is or not is seldom debated because for small 
society peoples connected by vast ocean, one’s people and 
place of belonging is fundamental to validating that this work, 
my writing, these words and ideas are real, authentic, a true 
story.  It therefore feels right for me to close the essay with the 
voice of a Melanesian scholar because a sizeable amount of 
angst surfacing from Australia and New Zealand’s regional 
relations has culminated from Melanesian leadership on the 
South Pacific front (Kabutaulaka, 2012a, 2012b). 
Climate-Change Blues: Sustaining Village Life in Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 6, 2013, ISSN 1178-6035 
295 
Without a doubt, regional polity in the 21st century South 
Pacific is different to the 2oth.  Branded as the Asian century, 
China’s economic and diplomatic presence in Pacific Island 
states has troubled Australia and New Zealand, two settler 
colonies and developed countries bordering the island states 
that have often taken for granted their countries historical and 
privileged position of supremacy over regional trade, politics, 
and leadership (China Daily, 2013; Pickford, 2013; Radio New 
Zealand, 2013b).  The Australian and New Zealand 
governments do recognise the region is rapidly changing.  But 
the real trouble they encounter is the limits of their own 
experiential knowledge in genuinely listening, without 
assuming they know what is best for Pacific Island states, and 
negotiating along conciliatory terms (Said, 1978). 
In the postcolonial present, Pacific Island states share a 
political aversion to being subjugated by a power imbalance of 
dominance and subservience, the kind of paternalistic 
relationship associated with the colonial past.  What I am 
saying is that Australian and New Zealand politicians and 
bureaucrats as a collective have marginal proficiency in how to 
engage with Pacific Islanders who are not happy, smiling, 
friendly Natives on cue and may no longer want to be their 
loyal, unquestioning, and obedient followers. 
The twist is that the 21st century South Pacific could 
transform into the Melanesian century given that this sub-
region has the largest landmass, natural resource wealth, and 
population (Regenvanu, 2013).  Regionally, Pacific Island 
states are navigating towards a contrasting future compared to 
2oth century history in which independent Melanesian states 
were framed by white academics as “hot spots” (State, Society 
and Governance in Melanesia, 2011).  Such labelling inferred 
that the Melanesian sub-region was unstable and susceptible 
to armed conflict, civil uprising, and weak states. 
How have representations of Melanesia altered today?  I 
am not inquiring about the “social imagination” of outsider 
academics, politicians and media in etching out white people’s 
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tales of black people in Melanesia (Mills, 1959).  But for the 
indigenous peoples of Melanesian states, what are their 
thoughts on the leadership role their sub-region might assume 
in remodelling regional polity for Pacific Island states? 
If there is a political swell in the South Pacific for bottom-
up regional polity allowing decision-making power to the 
masses, to the ordinary people, then Pacific Islander 
academics are doubly accountable (Marcellin, 2013; Powell, 
2013).  In the first vein because of blood ties to kinfolk and an 
origin place, there is an inherited social responsibility to the 
communities we research, write about, lay claim to as our 
people, and who acknowledge us as one of their own.  An 
insider’s position, however, is also intellectual prowess in the 
research industry granting expertise that researchers of our 
homelands who are not Pacific Islanders envy, covet, and have 
difficulty dismantling and ignoring. 
In the very industry Pacific Islander academics make a 
living from – the university system – a consciousness develops 
in which it becomes standard practice to scrutinise dominant 
narratives created by others about our kind; if anything, so 
the others know that “stories are central to power” and we are 
about the business of documenting the counter narrative 
(Kabutaulaka, 2012b, p. 3).  On this note, the final word 
belongs to Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka from the Weather 
Coast of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. 
 
You see, stories are central to power and as a 
means of controlling society.  It is no secret that if one 
controls the narrative, then one could control knowledge 
about and representations of societies, cultures and 
peoples.  It is because of this that some governments 
(and others in positions of power) often want to control 
stories that are told about them and those of the 
societies they rule.  But, also important are the story 
tellers, the audiences, where stories are told, and the 
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purposes for which they are told. (Kabutaulaka, 2012b, 
p. 3).   
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